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This paper studies the transmission mechanism from family culture to economic institutions, 
by analyzing the impact of the within family organization on the original design of the public 
pension systems. We build a simple OLG model with families featuring either weak or strong 
internal ties. When pensions systems are initially introduced, in society with strong ties they 
replicate the tight link between generations by providing earnings related benefits; whereas in 
societies with weak family ties they only act as a safety net. To test this transition mechanism, 
we consider Todd (1982) historical classification of family types across countries. We find 
that in societies dominated by absolute nuclear families (i.e., weak family ties), pension 
systems act as a flat safety net entailing a large within-cohort redistribution, and viceversa in 
societies characterized by stronger family ties where pension systems are more generous. This 
link between the type of families and the design of pension systems is robust to testing for 
alternative explanations, such as legal origin, religion, urbanization and democratization of 
the country at the time of their introduction. Interestingly, historical family types matter for 
explaining the design of the pension systems, which represents a persistent feature, but not 
their size, which have largely changed over time. 
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Institutions matter for economic development and growth.1 A recent literature has em-
phasized the impact of pre-existing legal, political and economic institutions on economic
development, income inequality, labor force participation of household members, living
arrangements and even fertility decisions (see, among the others, Putnam, 1993, Tabellini,
2008 and 2009, Fernandez and Fogli, 2009, Guiso et al., 2006). Whether these historical in-
stitutions aﬀect social-economic outcomes through their impact on current institutions or
through a less tangible, cultural transmission process is instead less understood (Tabellini,
2009).
In this paper, we focus on the role of what is arguably the primal institution: the fam-
ily. We emphasize the economic relevance of the historical patterns of the within family
organization. The organization of the family structure includes the relation between par-
ents and kids, from their childhood till their parents’ old age; the relation among siblings,
for instance vis-a-vis the inheritance from their parents; and the relation between the fam-
ily as a unit and the society at large. These primal aspects of the family organization can
be transmitted over time, codiﬁed in the law, or even embedded into newly born economic
institutions. Our point of departure is that when the family is substituted in one of its
economic roles by a new institution, the economic organization that was prevailing within
the family is likely to be adopted by the new-born institution. To study this transmission
mechanism from family culture (or organization) to economic institutions, we concentrate
on the impact of the family structure on the design of the most widely spread welfare state
program in the world: the public pension system.
Before the introduction of public pension systems, which largely occurred between the
beginning of the XX century and the aftermath of world war II, families were almost the
unique providers of old-age security for their elderly members. However, the organization
of the within-family insurance system largely diﬀered across regions and family types.
For instance, while in some countries, such as England, kids had no legal obligation to
support their parents, in France, they were morally, but also legally reliable for their
elderly parents’ health and economic situations (see Twigg and Grand, 1998).I n t h e
latter families, parents could hence rely on their oﬀsprings for complete old age support,
to an extent that of course depended on their own and on their kids’ economic conditions.
In the former case, instead, upward vertical support (from the kids to their parents)
was less common, and eﬀectively consisted of a safety net, whenever parents fell into
1See, among the others, the seminal works by Acemoglu et al. (2001), North (1990), La Porta et al.
(1997).
3poverty. Our goal is thus to understand to what extent the principles governing the
family organization have inﬂuenced the design of pension systems since their introduction,
shaping those fundamental characteristics that are still present in the current systems, and
that diﬀerentiate them across countries. Did the initial design of pension systems mirror
the within family organization? Did countries characterized by families providing strong
vertical support in old age favor the emergence of earning-related insurance schemes that
replace a large share of the workers’ previous wage? And did countries characterized by
weak children responsibility for the old age consumption of their parents endorse ﬂat-rate
pension schemes providing only a safety net to the elderly?
To give an answer to these fundamental questions, we ﬁrst build a simple two-periods
OLG model to analyze the link between the structure of family and the design of pensions.
We analyze two family structures characterized by weak and strong family ties, and hence
by diﬀerent within family organizations. We consider two economic and demographic
scenarios. In an "old regime", family members lived close to one another and the cost
of providing resources to the elderly was small. In a "new regime", arising for instance
from industrialization, urbanization and similar processes, which induce nuclearization of
the family, family members tend to be more spread out geographically, and the cost of
transferring resources to the elderly increases. Our model shows that, in the "old regime",
individuals in societies characterized by weak family ties are more likely to save than
those in strong family ties. In the "new regime", pensions are more likely to emerge under
weak rather than under strong family ties. However, if they emerge, pension systems are
more comprehensive and generous in societies with strong family ties, where they come to
substitute the kids to old parents family transfers. Also in societies with weak family ties,
pensions reﬂect the pre-existing family organization and thus only provide a safety net.
To test the predictions of our model on the initial design of pension systems, we con-
sider a historical analysis of family structures. We use Emmanuel Todd’s classiﬁcation of
medieval family types (Todd, 1983) to analyze how the diﬀerent types of within family
organizations shape the fundamental characteristics of the initial design of the diﬀerent
pension systems, which are still present in the current systems. We classify four family
organizations in four types - absolute nuclear, egalitarian nuclear, authoritarian, commu-
nitarian - delivering a complete picture of the family relationships in each region of the
world since medieval era, which proved to be persistent over time. In particular, absolute
nuclear families (dominating in Anglo-Saxon countries, Holland and Denmark) feature a
high degree of within family independence — both for parents in their inheritance decisions,
and for their children — and thus present weak family ties, as opposed to the other types
4of families.
Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that in countries where absolute nuclear families prevail,
pension schemes act mainly as a ﬂat safety net. To deﬁne the design of the pension
system, we consider replacement rates, which measure the ratio between pension beneﬁts
and labor income prior to retirement, for diﬀerent income levels. If a pension system
replaces a constant proportion of the workers’ income, these replacement rates will be
roughly constant across income levels. On the other hand, they will widely diﬀer - being
higher for low-income workers, if the pension system acts as a safety net. 2
This link between the family type and the design of pension systems is robust to
including several other variables, which may constitute alternative explanations of the
introduction of the pension systems, such as legal origin, religion, urbanization and de-
mocratization of the country at the time of the introduction, the current GDP, share of
elderly in the population, electoral rules and forms of government. Interestingly, historical
family types matter for explaining the design of the pension systems, which constitutes a
persistent feature, but not their size, which has instead largely changed over time.
A simple comparison may help to appreciate the relevance of the family organization
in shaping the design of pension systems. Consider four, geographically closed countries
characterized by the same (Scandinavian) legal origin, such as Denmark, Finland, Norway
and Sweden. According to Todd classiﬁcation, Norway and Sweden featured authoritarian
families, Finland was characterized by a communitarian family structure, while Denmark
was based on absolute nuclear families. Also the design of their pension system diﬀers.
With a ratio of the pension replacement rates across income levels (respectively at 75%
and at 150% of the average wage) equal to 1.6, and an average replacement rate of 54%, the
weak-family-ties Denmark stands out for its safety net like, highly redistributive pension
system. Norway and Sweden also have somewhat redistributive (their ratio of replacement
rates across income being respectively 1.25 and 1.09), but more generous systems, with an
average replacement rate equal to 65.1% and to 68.2%. On the other hand, Finland, which
is characterized by a communitarian family structure, features a perfectly Bismarckian
pension system (the ratio of replacement rates across income is equal to 1), with an
average replacement rate of 78.8%.
A recent literature has analyzed the role of the family as a primal institution aﬀecting
2As we will explain in section 3.2, pension schemes with an earnings-related formula are typically
referred to as "Bismarckian" systems, while ﬂat-rate ones as "Beveridgean" systems. See Disney and
Johnson (2001), Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007), OECD(2005) for a classiﬁcation of current pension systems
according to their redistributive design and Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007), Koethenburger et al. (2008)
for political-economy explanations of their diﬀerent nature.
5economic outcomes, and its role of intergenerational transmission of culture. For instance,
Alesina and Giuliano (2007) claim that the strength of family ties represents a fundamen-
tal cultural trait shaping economic behavior and attitudes. They elaborate a measure of
culture based on family relationships and quantify its role in explaining important eco-
nomic variables, such as the amount of home production versus market activities and the
role of women. A previous argument by Reher (1998) also pointed out that family ties help
explaining living arrangements and geographical mobility of young generations. Indeed,
the link between family types and individual economic behavior dates back to Banﬁeld
(1958), who ﬁrst used the term "amoral family" to describe the social and cultural en-
vironment that was shaping individual decisions in a small village in the south of Italy.
More recently, Duranton et al. (2009) used Todd’s (1983) medieval age family structures
to explaining regional diﬀerences in economic outcomes. Algan and Cahuc (2007) shows
that family culture is responsible for cross-country heterogeneity in employment rates.
Alesina et al. (2010) argue that in cultures with strong family ties individuals are less
mobile and prefer more regulated labor market while weak family ties are associated with
more ﬂexible labor markets, which then require higher geographic mobility of workers to
be eﬃcient.3 All these papers consider the family culture to be persistent over time. Bisin
and Verdier (2001) and Tabellini (2008) endogenize this cultural transformation mecha-
nism by showing how rational, altruistic parents may optimally choose to transmit their
family values to their children.
The link between family relations and welfare systems has also received a recent at-
tention, mainly by sociologists. Focusing on Europe, Esping-Andersen (1999) argues that
where family ties are stronger, social risks are more internalized in the family by pooling
resources across generations. Other authors have stressed the impact of gender culture on
the welfare state (Lewis, 1992) and the role of Christian religion in European welfare state
(Daly, 1997). Coleman (1988) argues that family ties can strengthen the support received
by young generations from the old while, at the same time, representing an obstacle for
innovation and new ideas. Finally, Pfau-Eﬃnger (2005) emphasizes the link between cul-
ture and welfare state policies, as she argues that welfare state policies diﬀer according to
the underlying cultural model of the family, and to how much importance is attributed to
3The impact of cultural factors on individual economic decisions is also analyzed in Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2006), who, after providing a deﬁnition of culture (“those customary beliefs and values that
ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation”), analyze as
as p e c i ﬁc example the impact of religion or ethnic origins on trust and on preferences for redistribution.
See also Fernandez (2007) for a survey of some of the recent empirical studies on the eﬀects of culture on
economic outcomes.
6the family for the production of welfare.
This paper is also related to a recent literature on the origin of welfare. According
to several authors (for a discussion, see Caucutt, Cooley and Guner, 2007, and Cutler
and Johnson,2004), Pay-As-You-Go pension systems that feature intergenerational trans-
fers from workers to retirees were introduced in the western world around the period of
urbanization. The rationale for the creation of a public transfer system was the rapid
change from the existence of an extended family living in the same house to smaller fam-
ilies dislocated in many diﬀerent places, due to the urbanization. In this new setup, kids
were unable to look after their parents providing for their old age needs and new forms
of insurance had to be introduced. Yet, this general theory has hard time matching the
timing of the urbanization process with the introduction of social security systems (see
e.g., Lindert, 1994, and Perotti and Schwienbacker, 2007). Our relation between family
types and the initial design of the social security system instead does not rest on a speciﬁc
date for the introduction of social security.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains the model, section 3 presents a
historical perspective on family ties drawing on Todd’s classiﬁcation, and discusses the
origins of pension systems and their design; section 4 describes our econometric analysis
and results and section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We introduce a simple two-periods OLG model to analyze the link between family structure
and pension design. We consider two stylized family structures: strong and weak family
ties. These two structures diﬀer in the rules, which deﬁne within-family property rights,
sharing of resources and degree of insurance. We also introduce two diﬀerent scenarios.
In an initial "old regime", family members and relatives tend to live close to one another.
Hence, while family may feature weak or strong ties, the cost of looking after a family
member (i.e. the elderly) is relatively low. We then consider a "new regime" driven for
instance by industrialization, urbanization and similar processes, in which a nuclearization
of the family has occurred, and looking after the old has become more costly for both weak
and strong ties families.
The next section introduces a description of these two family structures. The main
economic decisions taken within the family for these two family types in the "old regime",
and the collective decision over pension systems are examined in the next section. An
analysis of these decisions under the "new regime" follows.
72.1 Strong and weak family ties
At each time  two generations of equal size are alive: adult and old. We consider a simple











where the superscripts indicate the generation (adult, old) and subscripts refer to the time
period.
Adults earn a constant income  and may save to increase the (family or individual)
resources in old age. During a fraction  of their old age, individuals enjoy high returns
from savings, equal to (1 + ), while during a fraction (1 − ) the returns are low and
equal to (1+),w i t h . It is convenient, but not crucial, to assume that 1+ =0 .





Old individuals do not work. They obtain the returns from their savings, and may






+1 are old age consumption respectively in the high and low returns state.
If a pension system is in place, adults pay a proportional tax  on their income,
and these revenues are used to provide pension beneﬁts to the elderly. Pensions are
distortionary, as captured by a parameter 0. The PAYG pension system is budget-
balanced:
 =( 1− ) (2)
Economic decisions are taken within the family. We consider two diﬀerent family types.
In families with strong ties, all the resources obtained by the two generations of individuals
are pooled within the family, under the direct control of the adults. Total resources of the
two generations at time  are used to ﬁnance the family consumption and the savings:
(1 − )+ + −1 (1 + )=
 + 
 +  (3)
Old individuals have no property rights on these resources, and thus also on the income
that they may contribute to provide, such as savings and pensions. Adults have a moral
(or perhaps even legal) obligation to provide an adequate level of consumption to the old,
irrespective of their contribution to the family resources. We capture this obligation by
imposing a constraint on the old consumption:

 ≥  ( = ) (4)
Hence, regardless of the state of the economy (that is, whether the returns on savings
are high or low), adults have to ensure a (large) percentage  of their income to the old
8family members. This is to capture the idea that in family with strong ties, adults have
to guarantee to their parents a high standard of living, which is similar to their own.
Families with weak ties feature a diﬀerent structure. No pooling of resources takes
place among family members and old have property rights on their savings and pensions.
However, the adults still have a moral (or legal) obligation to keep each old family member
above a subsistence consumption level, ,w i t h1, if the old does not have enough
resources. This limited degree of within family insurance is represented by the following
constraint on the individuals’ consumption:

 ≥  ( = )
Finally, for both weak and strong family ties, we assume that adults have to provide
themselves at least with a subsistence consumption level, 
 ≥ , and thus have to refrain
from saving all the available resources for future consumption. Notice that, in absence of
this constraint, this extreme (saving) behavior may arise under some speciﬁcations, due
to the linearity in the utility function.
To capture the idea that in families with weak ties the adults only provide a safety
net, whereas in strong families they share consumption more evenly among the family
members, we assume that  ≤ min().
To characterize the emergence of a pension system, we consider that the introduction
of the system is decided upon by the current adult generation, and that the system has
to be supported by all future generations of adults.
In the following sections, we analyze the economic decisions taken in families with
strong and weak ties in the old and in the new regime. We also examine the collective
decisions over the pension system.
2.2 The "Old Regime"
2.2.1 Strong family ties
In the "old regime", adult individuals living in families with strong ties have control
of the common pool of family resources. They decide how much to save, and how to
share consumption across family members, and there is no transaction cost in transferring
resources to the elderly. Saving amounts to reduce the resources in the period when the
adults have control over the consumption decision, in order to increase the family pool of
resources in the next period, when they are old and have no property rights. It is easy
to see (see Proposition 1 below) that, regardless of the return on the savings, adults have
no incentive to save, and hence  =0 . As all the current family resources are used to
9ﬁnance current consumption, the adults will maximize their own consumption subject to
the constraint at eq. 4 that characterizes a strong family.
Proposition 1 In absence of transaction costs in providing resources to the elderly (the
"old regime"), a strong family features no savings,  =0and the adults oppose the
introduction of a pension system,  =  =0 .
In strong families, the existence of a common family pool of resources managed by the
adults limits their incentive to save for the future. In this environment, a pension system
is not supported. In fact, its introduction would amount to tax the adults by an amount
 and to provide back resources to the old equal to  =( 1− ). For any positive
l e v e lo fd i s t o r t i o n ,0, pensions are thus opposed.
2.2.2 Weak family ties
When family ties are weak, there is no pooling of resources and every generation has
property rights on its own income. Adults only have a moral obligation to keep elderly
family members at a subsistence level of consumption equal to 
It is convenient to consider ﬁrst what happens in absence of a pension system. Unlike
in strong families, in this environment adults have more incentives to save for old con-
sumption, since (i) they have property rights on their savings, and (ii) they will only be
guaranteed a minimum subsistence level from their oﬀsprings, if they reach old age with
no resources. Due to the linear utility function, their saving decision will be binary. If
they choose to save, adults will transfer into old age all their disposable income, consisting
of their adult income, , net of the transfers to the old members of their family and of
their own subsistence consumption. When old, in good times, they will use their savings
to consume, and will rely on the subsistence family transfers in bad times only. If instead
the adults prefer not to save, they will consume all their disposable income, and they
will always rely on the subsistence family transfers in old age. The following proposition
characterizes the equilibrium of the economy.
Proposition 2 In absence of transaction costs in providing resources to the elderly (the
"old regime"), the following equilibria may arise:
• If 

1−−, a weak family features no savings,  =0and the adults oppose the
introduction of a pension system,  =  =0 .
• If 

1−−, a weak family features positive savings,   0 and the adults still
oppose the introduction of a pension system  =  =0
10In weak families, for high values of the return rate , the existence of within family
property rights induces the adults to remain at subsistence consumption and to save. These
savings increase their old age consumption in the good states. In the bad states, instead,
the elderly have to rely on the transfers from their oﬀsprings to reach the subsistence level
of consumption. For low values of the return rate , instead, the adults will choose not
to save.
In both cases, a pension system fails to be supported. In fact, not only the pension
system is distortionary, but its introduction amounts for the adults to transfer resources
to the elderly in every state of the world (rather than in the bad state only), and therefore
either reduces the amount of resources available for the savings (when   0)o rt h e i r
consumption when adults (when  =0 ).
2.3 The "New Regime"
In the initial "old regime", families were assumed to be geographically concentrated, with
family members living close to one another — if not together. Hence, the cost of looking
after the old was relatively low, although in diﬀerent families (weak or strong) adults were
required to perform diﬀerent roles.
In this section, we consider the economic decisions by these two families in a "new
regime", due for instance to industrialization, urbanization and similar processes, which
imposed an exogenous nuclearization of the family. We characterize this "new regime"
with two crucial elements: (i) an exogenous increase in the cost of providing resources to
the elderly, due for instance to the increased geographical distance between the adults and
their parents, so that every unit of consumption provided to the elderly costs 1+ to their
oﬀs p r i n g s ;a n d( i i )t h ea c q u i s i t i o no fp r o p e r t yr i g h t so v e rt h e i rs a v i n g sb yt h ee l d e r l yi nt h e
strong families, due again to a possible geographical separation among family members.
The moral obligation by the adults towards their parents — and hence the family culture
— remains however unmodiﬁed.
2.3.1 Strong family ties
This "new regime" may cause large adjustments in the internal organization of strong
families. Strong families may continue with their organization, and just choose to pay
the higher cost of providing resources to the elderly; or the adults may exploit the newly
established property rights over their savings, and choose to save for old age. Even more
importantly, changes may occur to the adults’ preferences over the introduction of a pen-
sion system, which may become a good substitute for private transfers to the elderly. The
11proposition below summarizes the economic decisions taken in a strong family during the
"new regime", and the collective decision over the pension system.
Proposition 3 In presence of transaction costs in providing resources to the elderly and
of property rights of the elderly (the "new regime"), the following equilibria may arise:
• If 

1−−(1+) a strong family features no savings,  =0 .A d u l t ss u p p o r tt h e
introduction of a pension system  = (1 − ),w i t h =






1−−(1+) a strong family features positive savings,   0.A d u l t ss u p p o r t
the introduction of a pension system  = (1 − ),w i t h =






For low rate of returns , although saving for old age consumption has now become
an option for the adults, who have acquired property rights in old age, they choose not to
save. In this case, the adults may just have to bear the higher transaction cost of providing
resources to the elderly. Alternatively, if this cost is high and/or the pension system is
suﬃciently eﬃcient, i.e., if (1 − )  , they prefer to delegate the support of the elderly
to a pension system. In this case, the public pension system will perfectly resemble the
family transfer, as  = (1 − )=.
For high values of the return from savings, , adults in strong families choose to remain
at subsistence consumption when adult and to save to increase their old age consumption.
The adults will provide this subsistence consumption to the elderly. However, if the




1+, the adults will choose to delegate even this minimal support of the elderly to
a pension system, which would provide  = . Notice that a pension system is more
likely to be introduced when savings are positive.
2.3.2 Weak family ties
In the "new regime", the cost of providing consumption to the elderly, when their savings
are not suﬃcient to reach the subsistence level, increases. Nevertheless, weak families may
continue with their organization. Adults may save for old age consumption and pay the
higher cost when they need to provide resources to the elderly. Alternatively, for low rate
of return, they may choose not to save and to rely on their kids for subsistence level of old
age consumption. However, if the transaction cost is large (relatively to the ineﬃciency
12of the pension system), the adults’ preferences over a pension system, which has become
a better substitute for private family transfers, may change and pensions be supported.
The next proposition summarizes the economic decisions taken in a weak family during
the "new regime", and the collective decision over the pension system.
Proposition 4 In presence of transaction costs in providing resources to the elderly and
of property rights of the elderly (the "new regime"), the following equilibria may arise:
• If 

1−−(1+) aw e a kf a m i l yf e a t u r e sn os a v i n g s , =0 .A d u l t s s u p p o r t t h e
introduction of a pension system  = (1 − ),w i t h = 





1−−(1+) a weak family features positive savings,   0.A d u l t s s u p p o r t
the introduction of a pension system  = (1 − ),w i t h = 





As before, for low values of the return rate , the adults choose not to save, since
savings will not provide enough resources in old age. They may thus have to bear the
higher transaction cost of providing resources to the elderly. Alternatively, if this cost
is high and/or the pension system is suﬃciently eﬃcient, i.e., if (1 − )  ,t h e yw i l l
delegate the support of the elderly to a pension system.
For high values of the return rate , the adults may prefer to remain at subsistence
consumption, and to keep at this level their family members, but to save to increase their
old age consumption. However, if the transaction cost is high and/or the pension system is
not very ineﬃcient, i.e., if  
1− −

1+, they may choose to delegate even this minimal
support of the elderly to a pension system. In both cases, the public pension system will
completely resemble the subsistence level family transfer as  = (1 − )=.
The analysis of the family organization in the "old" and "new" regime for the strong
and weak families provides interesting insights. Not surprisingly, adults living in weak
families are more likely to save, due mainly to the better property rights that they enjoy
on their savings in old age. In both cases, no pension system emerges under the "old"
regime. Pension schemes may instead be introduced under the "new" regime, in both
family structure, due to the increased cost of looking after the elderly. Figure 1 summarizes
the results for the new regime. For a given family type, pensions are more likely to emerge
when adults choose to save for their old age consumption, thereby suggesting that pensions
represent a good alternative to private savings. When comparing across family types, ﬁgure
1 shows that, for a given saving behavior, pensions are more likely to be introduced in
13weak families, but they are less generous. This is because in strong families, adults have
a moral obligation to ensure a (large) share, , of their income to the elderly, whereas in
countries with weak families the adults’ obligations are limited to the subsistence level ().
3 Historical perspectives on family ties and pension system
design
3.1 Family types
Characterizing the internal organization of the family, the relations between parents and
children, among children and between the family and the society at large, represents a
diﬃcult task. A recent literature (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2007) has used survey data
on individual responses to questions on the relevance of the family, on the time spent with
relatives, and on living arrangements to provide a quantitative measure of these family
ties. Yet, while current relations within and across families are certainly shaped by cultural
factors, they are also largely inﬂuenced by the incentives provided by economic and legal
institutions, such as labor market regulations, tax code and the welfare state. To be able
to study the primal eﬀect of the family organization on the initial design of the welfare
state, we thus need to use measurements of the family organization dating back to periods
prior to the introduction of welfare state policies. A historical classiﬁcation of family ties
is in Todd (1983), who used historical monographs sometimes dating back more than 500
years, to compile a geographical mapping of family ties. We consider four family types
(see ﬁgure 2):
- Absolute nuclear families are characterized by (i) non-cohabitation between parents
and adult children (children typically leave their family after their adolescence, form their
own family and become independent); (ii) lack of stringent inheritance rules; and (iii)
exogamous marriage relationships. These families nurture individualism. Every person
is independent, and has to rely mainly on his/her own eﬀort. This clearly implies total
independency of children from their parents, and viceversa. The choice of taking care of
old-age parents becomes a subjective decision, rather than a generalized, codiﬁed value.
As parents have no obligation to support their adult children, kids may in turn also choose
whether to take care of old parents or not, and to what extent. Anglo-Saxon countries,
Holland and Denmark belong to this group;
- Egalitarian nuclear families feature (i) no cohabitation of parents and adult children,
(ii) exogamy, but (iii) the independence among generations is weaker than in the previous
case. In fact, more precise inheritance rules are typically in place, based on the principle
14of equality among siblings. This family welfare context favors the emergence of ideologies
of “universalism”, which recognize the value of equality, often in contrast to individualism.
Egalitarian families encourage the persistence of stronger relations between parents and
children. Moreover, to the extent that parents have a (moral or legal) obligation not to
favour a kid over the others in their inheritance decisions, all children become equally
responsible for their old-age. Mediterranean countries (France, Italy, Spain, Greece),
Portugal, Romania, Poland, Latin America (apart from Cuba) and Ethiopia are in this
group;
- Stem or authoritarian families are based on cohabitation of parents and adult children
(sons typically remain in their parents’ home and are subject to a vertical hierarchical
structure). Rules and social norms are strongly transmitted from one generation to the
other. This strengthens family ties. However, the principle of equality is typically not
recognized in inheritance rules. Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Czech Republic,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Scotland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Israel and Gitans populations
are characterized by this family structure;
- Communitarian families are also based on cohabitation, but they aﬃrm equality
among siblings in inheritance rules, which reduces individualism and reinforces family
ties. This system was in place in Russia, Yugoslavia, Slovak, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary,
Albania, Baltic republics, Centre of Italy, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Indonesia and India.
Todd historical classiﬁcation of family types is simple, but, at the same time, it captures
those aspects of the intergenerational family organization that are crucial to understand
the diﬀerent incentives for the early design of the pension systems. In communitarian
and, to a lesser extent, in egalitarian nuclear families, children have a strong moral (or
even legal) obligation to support their parents in old age, while this feature is somewhat
less present in authoritarian families and almost absent in absolute nuclear families. To
relate this historical classiﬁcation to the current literature on family culture, we compare
it to the analysis of family ties in Alesina and Giuliano (2007). They use three individual
questions from the World Value Survey: (i) How family is important in life? the answer
ranging from 1, "very important", to 4, "not at all important"; (ii) Choose between A
(corresponding to the score of 0): “Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s
parents are, one must always love and respect them” and B (score equals 1): “One does
not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behavior
and attitudes”; (iii) Choose between A (score equals 0) “Parents’ duty is to do their best
for their children even at the expense of their own well-being” and B (score equals 1)
“Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacriﬁce their own well-being
15for the sake of their children”. To compare their current measures of family ties based on
these questions with Todd historical classiﬁcation we estimate the following simple model:
 = +1+2+3+4+
where  is the score attributed to the answer that individual  gives to each of the three
questions (respectively in column 1,2 and 3),  is a set of individual controls (age, age
squared, income, education, political views) and absolute nuclear families is the excluded
category of family types. Table 1 shows the correlation between Todd (1983) and Alesina
and Giuliano (2007) classiﬁcations. Todd classiﬁcation plays no role in explaining current
responses on the importance of the family (column 1). However, stronger (current) kid-
to-parents links (see column 2) are associated with egalitarian nuclear and communitarian
families as compared to absolute nuclear families. Finally, column 3 describes the down-
ward vertical ties from parents to kids, where authoritarian and communitarian families
are characterized by the prominent role of the parents.
3.2 The design of pension systems
In the western world, public pension systems were initially introduced between the end of
the XIX century and the end of World War II. Besides their ﬁnancing method - PAYG,
FF or mixed- ever since their introduction, pension systems have largely diﬀered in their
design, generosity and coverage. The two polar cases are represented by the so-called
Bismarckian and the Beveridgean systems4. A Bismarckian scheme covers all the workers,
who have contributed to the system throughout their working life, and provides them with
ap e n s i o nb e n e ﬁt that is strictly related to these contributions, and typically replaces a
large share of the workers’ previous wage. The replacement rates, i.e., the ratio of post-
retirement pension beneﬁts to pre-retirement earnings, are thus approximately constant
across individuals of diﬀerent incomes, and the system entails no intragenerational redis-
tribution. Beveridgean systems have instead more universal coverage; they still base their
ﬁnancing on social security contributions, but typically the pension beneﬁt do not replace
a large share of the worker’s previous wage. In fact, in Beveridgean systems, contributions
are proportional to earnings but beneﬁts are almost ﬂat. As such, they mainly constitute
a safety net that ensures enough retirement income to low-income workers to cover their
4The names “Bismarckian” and “Beveridgean” date back to the origin of the social security system in
Germany and to the alternative system proposed after some decades by the Beveridge report in the United
Kingdom respectively. In the ﬁrst social security system, created in Germany by Bismarck in 1881, beneﬁts
were earning-related. The Beveridge report, published in 1942 in the UK, introduced the alternative idea
of a minimum system, i.e., a system with ﬂat-rate beneﬁts for qualiﬁed retirees.
16pensions wage, while providing a low replacement of their pensions wage to middle and
high income workers; thus, intragenerational redistribution is large.
To measure the design of the pension system, we thus consider the evolution of the
replacement rates across individuals of diﬀerent income groups. Large diﬀerences in the
replacement rates — with high values for low-income individuals and viceversa — identify
pension systems that only act as a safety net, and should thus be associated with small
family ties; and viceversa for constant replacement rates. As discussed in the next section,
we only have current measures of the replacement rates — namely around the year 2000.
Hence, for some countries, such as Germany, more than hundred years have passed since
the initial design of the pension systems. Fortunately, this design has been rather persistent
over time. In fact, while the size of pensions changes rapidly over years, depending on
the economic and political circumstances (see Galasso, 2006), the redistributive design has
been proved to be much more stable. For instance, the United Kingdom is still an example
of a ﬂat-rate pension system, while Germany, Italy and France have remained earnings-
related. For a sample of 20 OECD countries, Krieger and Traub (2008) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
evidence of a change in the intragenerational redistribution in PAYG systems. Some
examples suggest that each scheme is even accentuating its original design: Bismarckian
systems are becoming more Bismarckian and analogously for Beveridgean schemes. Italy,
for instance, has implemented reforms which have accentuated the earning-related design,
by shifting from a deﬁned beneﬁt formula of calculating pensions to a notional deﬁned
contribution one, which implies a full link of contributions and beneﬁts, thus entailing
almost no intragenerational redistribution. On the opposite, in the last few years the
UK program has become even more redistributive: rich individuals may ‘contract out’ of
the public system and enjoy a reduction of the contribution rate, while the State Second
Pension (S2P) scheme introduced in 2002 implies a particular attention to the level of
pension that represents a safety net.
3.3 Alternative determinants of pension design
Our simple model at section 2 highlights the existence of a transmission mechanism from
pre-existing family organizations to the original design of pension systems. Pension sys-
tems were introduced to provide old-age support, which was previously provided within
the family, and they were designed to mirror the same organization that was prevailing
within the family. Hence, where families characterized by weak ties among generations
and strong independence within the family, such as Todd absolute nuclear families, prevail,
pension systems provide only a basic safety net, but they are not compelled to ensure a
17complete provision of the elderly retirement income.
Besides family organizations, there may be alternative determinants of the origins and
main features of the welfare state, and alternative mechanisms of transmission from pre-
existing contexts to the welfare state. The literature has so far focused on the role of
religion, democratization, urbanization and legal origins. Flora (1983, 1987) argues that
the welfare state was born under the process of secularization, i.e. the decline of religion
on human conduct, and the inﬂuence of Protestantism. When religion institutions lost
their dominance over society and in non-religious roles, and people reduced their religious
practices and beliefs, the state replaced the church in the “public” spheres. Protestantism
favored the development of the welfare state, in opposition to Catholicism since the former
encouraged the mobilization of lower income levels into mass politics and reduced the
power of the church into the public sphere, while the latter continued to be dominated
by the conﬂict between state and church.5 This contrast between the Protestant and the
Catholic countries helps also to explain the diﬀerences in timing and quality (such as the
level of centralization and the degree of state intervention) of the welfare states.6 Since
the diﬀusion of religion has proved very persistent, this original eﬀect may continue to
shape current welfare state systems.
Democratization may represent an alternative mechanism. According to the modern-
ization theory (Lipset, 1959), the introduction of the welfare state was due to the growing
needs for social policy, social and economic equality and security, created by the industri-
alization. In urban, richer societies, the demand for welfare state increases. Moreover, the
process of economic modernization promotes also the foundation and the consolidation of
democracies.7 In democracies, poor individuals take part in politics and, as a consequence,
policies favouring these individuals and promoting equality, such as redistributive policies
and welfare state emerge (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003). Thus, democratic
5The relation between religion and in general socio-economic transformations was ﬁrst identiﬁed by
Weber (1905), who linked the Protestant Reform to the modern capitalism. Guiso et al (2003) ﬁnd that
religious beliefs, especially Christian religions, are associated with growth enhancing economic reforms.
See also McCleary and Barro (2006).
6Recently, van Kersbergen and Manow (2009) reconsider the role of Protestantism, and show that
Reformed Protestantism substantially delayed and restricted modern social policy, while the Lutheran
state churches positively contributed to the introduction of social protection programs. They also argue
that the interaction between religion and electoral rules produced the diﬀerent political class coalitions
sustaining diﬀerent welfare regimes.
7Notice that the interaction between modernization and democratization is a two-way relation and it
is diﬃcult to know the correct direction of causality: economic development favors democracy, but also
stable democracies would entail economic growth.
18countries tend to have larger welfare states.
Legal origins may also shape the pre-existing context in which pension systems were
introduced. According to La Porta et al (1997) legal origins are a good proxy for ﬁnancial
development. As argued by Pinotti (2009) more ﬁnancial development implies less PAYG
social security and viceversa, thus establishing a causal relationship from pre-existing legal
origins and the size and features of the pension system (see also Perotti and Schwienbacher,
2007).
Finally, as argued by Persson and Tabellini (2004), the size of old age security may
also depend on electoral rules (majoritarian/proportional) and forms of government (pres-
idential/parliamentary). In particular, presidential regimes tend to induce smaller public
sectors, while proportional elections lead to higher, but less targeted government spending,
and to larger budget deﬁcits.
In the next section, we will test the validity of the transmission mechanism running
from family types to pension’s design compared to these alternative channels.
4 The Empirical Analysis
4.1 Empirical strategy
We aim to test the eﬀect of the pre-existing family organization, in particular its ver-
tical kids-to-parents transfer structure, on the initial design of pension systems around
the world. To characterize the diﬀerent family organizations, we consider Todd classiﬁ-
cation described at section 3.1 for a set of 85 countries, as shown at ﬁgure 2. We use
diﬀerent measures to identify the initial design of the pension system. Since Bismar-
ckian systems provided high replacement rates that are constant across income groups,
while in Beveridgean systems the replacement rates vary widely across income, we identify
the design of the pension scheme with the ratio between replacement rates (the ratio of
post-retirement pension beneﬁts to pre-retirement earnings) at diﬀerent levels of income.
Higher ratios imply diﬀerent provision of pension to diﬀerent retirees, relative to their
previous wage income, and are consistent with a safety net being provided to low-income,
and little replacement being given to the others. We also use a direct measure of the
current replacement rate for an individual with the average wage in the economy. Higher
replacements of his income are associated with more generous pension for the retiree, and
thus indicate that the system provides more than just a safety net. Pension coverage,
deﬁned as the share of population between 15 and 64 years old that is covered by the
pension system, captures the diﬀusion of the system among the population. A system
19providing only a safety net should have more coverage, and yet being associated to lower
spending. Pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP is also considered as a dependent
variable. For these pension variables, we consider their available data around the year
2000. While the redistributive design of the pension systems has been rather stable since
their introduction, and thus these recent values may be a good proxy for the initial design,
current coverage and pension spending will largely be determined by current demographic,
economic and political processes.
We estimate a simple cross country model:
 =  + 1 + 2 + 3+
4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 
where  is our dependent variable measuring the redistributive design of the pension
scheme (or the size of pension) in country ;  is a dummy variable equal
t o1i fc o u n t r y features a communitarian family and 0 otherwise; 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if country  has an autoritharian family and 0 otherwise;
 a dummy variable equal to 1 if country  there has an egalitarian
nuclear family and 0 otherwise;  and  are geographical dummy
variables equal to 1 if country  belongs respectively to OECD, Latin America and Africa
and 0 otherwise;  is a set of control variables, which include alternative legal, cultural,
political, economic and demographic determinants that could have aﬀected the design and
the size of the system, and  is the error term. The absolute nuclear family type is thus
the omitted one and our reference family type.
For our dependent variables  we use diﬀerent measures of design and size of the
pensions: (i) the ratio between the replacement rates of a worker earning one-half of the
average income and the one of a worker earning exactly the average income (repl50_1);
(ii) the ratio between the replacement rate of a worker earning the 75% of the average
income and the one of a worker earning 150% of the average income (repl75_150); (iii)
the replacement rate of a worker earning the average income (replacem1); (iv) the pension
coverage, i.e. the share of population between 15 and 64 years old that is covered by the
pension system, and (v) the pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of our main measures of pensions design,
(repl50_1) and (repl75_150) around the world, suggesting that they vary widely across
geographic areas.
Due to the small number of observations, we run diﬀerent sets of regressions includ-
ing one of the following control variables, , at a time: legal origins, religion, level of
urbanization, level of democracy, GDP and the share of elderly.
20Our unit of analysis is a country, since pension design varies at country level but is
homogeneous within country. Furthermore, since this design displays a strong persistence
and we are considering the historical family determinants of the current pension, we ab-
stract from the time component and rely on a cross-country analysis. Data availability
limits the number of observations to 55 when we use the replacement rates (repl50_1) and
to 78 when we measure the size of pension.
Data sources are described in the appendix, including the list. Summary statistics are
at table 2.
4.2 Results
Table 3 presents our baseline speciﬁcation: we regress our measures of the design and size
of pensions on the three types of pre-existing family structures and on the geographical
dummies. Communitarian and egalitarian nuclear families are less redistributive than
absolute nuclear ones for our two measures of the replacement ratio. Using our second
measure, also authoritarian families are less redistributive than absolute nuclear. This
result is in line with the idea that absolute nuclear families capture weak and independent
relations between parents and children in the family, which lead to the design of a pension
system that resembles a safety net. In families that prize independence, and do not tie
the parents’ hands to equal inheritance rules, children do not perceive an obligation to
provide old-age support to their parents, unless perhaps they are in strong need of help.
This idea translates into pensions: individuals only expect to receive from the state a
safety net. When instead children took good care of their elderly parents, the state has
to provide a suﬃcient pension to replace the individual previous wage income, not just a
safety net. This idea is supported by the level of the replacement rate being positively
related to the strength of the family ties: all other family types enjoy a higher replacement
than countries with absolute nuclear families, indicating that they provide more than a
safety net.
When we turn to the size of pension, as expected, absolute nuclear families are asso-
ciated with a higher coverage, while current pension spending is instead unrelated to the
types of families.
We now enrich our baseline scenario by introducing additional variables to test for
alternative channels to explain the original design of pension systems, or which may inﬂu-
ence both the design of pensions and the family values. We ﬁrst introduce legal origins,
which, following La Porta et al. (1997) are classiﬁed as Anglo-Saxon, Socialist, Germany
and French. Figure 5 shows the distribution of these indicators across the world. By
21comparing ﬁgure 2 and 5 we do not see a clear association between the family types and
the origin of the legal system, suggesting that family ties are capturing some inherent
values diﬀerent from what is expressed by the origin of the legal system. This is conﬁrmed
in table 4, where we include the four dummy variables referring to legal origins in our
baseline speciﬁcation. When compared to communitarian and egalitarian nuclear families,
absolute nuclear families remain associated with less earnings-related schemes and larger
coverage. Communitarian families have also a higher replacement rate. The Anglo-Saxon
legal origin is associated with less coverage and less pension spending, but it does not seem
to aﬀect the design.8
We then turn to religion, which has also been considered a crucial and persistent
determinant of economic and social outcomes (see section 2.3). We hence need to control
whether religion, rather than the principles underlying family types, is the real responsible
for diﬀerent pension design across countries. Figure 6 suggests that the diﬀusion of the
main religions, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Islamic, around the world in 1900 is not
directly associated with the design of pensions. Redistributive pensions are present in
many Protestant countries, but also in the catholic Argentina and Ireland. In table 5, we
control for the relative share of the four religions in the diﬀerent countries in 1900 (i.e.,
at the period around or before the introduction of the pension systems). We ﬁnd that
absolute nuclear family are again associated with more redistributive pension schemes than
the other types of families, while religion seems to have no eﬀect on the design of pensions,9
but to be associated with small pension expenditure and coverage in countries with a large
share of Muslims. Similarly, in table 6, an Herﬁndal index of religious homogeneity is not
signiﬁcantly associated with the design, while the types of family (absolute nuclear family
as opposed to the others) remain crucial.
In table 7, we include a measure of the level of urbanization of the country at the
beginning of the XX century. While this variable turns out to be associated with the size
of the pensions system in the obvious direction (more urbanization implies more pensions),
it is not signiﬁcant to explain their design. The types of family instead remain signiﬁcant.
In table 8, we introduce an indicator of the political environment in the diﬀerent
countries in 1900. Do the design of system or their size depend on whether countries
were more democratic at the time of the introduction of the system? A higher level of
8This result is in line with the idea that private pensions may be substitute for public pensions when
ﬁnancial markets are well developed, which is in turn associated with English legal origin.
9Unfortunately, the CIA factbook reports observations only for 49 countries, among those for which we
have the pension data. The coeﬃcient of the family types are less precisely estimated, but point estimates
are in line with the estimates in the previous tables.
22democratization, as captured by the Polity2 indicator10 has no impact on the design of
pensions; as usual, having an absolute nuclear family organization implies a signiﬁcantly
diﬀe r e n td e s i g nt h a na n yo t h e rf a m i l yt y p e ,n a mely a higher redistributive component.
In table 9, we control for current economic and demographic variables, that is, the level
of GDP and the share of elderly in the population. Richer countries have higher coverage,
while more elderly are associated with both higher coverage and more pension spending.11
Current income and aging however do not explain the design of pensions. The type of
family remains signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations in the usual way.
Finally, in table 10, we control for the electoral rule and form of government. As
expected, countries with majoritarian systems have lower coverage and level of pension
and lower replacement rates than countries with proportional systems. However, having
a majoritarian or presidential electoral rule has no eﬀect on the redistributive design of
pensions, while family types continue to show the same relationships found so far. The form
of government, presidential versus parliamentary, turns out to play no role. Unfortunately,
observations are drastically reduced due to data availability.
To sum up, we have found that the family organization plays a crucial role as primal
determinant of the design of pension systems since their introduction. Instead, legal origin
and religion, which have been extensively suggested to determine other socioeconomic
outcomes, play no role in this case. Similarly, other determinants of the context in which
pensions were introduced, such as the level of urbanization or democratization of the
country at that time, or current variables such as current GDP and the share of elderly in
the population, have also little to say about the design of pensions. Interestingly, some of
these variables turn out to be related to current features such as the size or the coverage
of the pensions, but not to old, persistent characteristics, such as the design. A family
organization based on absolute nuclear families represents the better correspondence to
the design of redistributive pension systems.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We have identiﬁed the types of family relationships as the ultimate cause of the design
of pension systems and contribute to rationalize its persistence over time. Why family?
Following Todd (1983), family does not depend on climate conditions, geological features,
10This indicator is widely used in both the economic and political science literature on democracy. For
details, see the appendix.
11There is a large literature on the link between aging and the size of social security (see Galasso and
Profeta, 2004, Disney, 2007).
23economic environment. It is impossible to associate it with geographic territories. The
system of latent values embedded in the family has no link with religion or language.
There is nothing pre-determined to the family relationships. In a world, behind the family
there is only the “hazard”.
We have found that absolute nuclear families, where the relations between parents and
children are weak, leads to the emergence of a pension system with ﬂat beneﬁtf o r m u l a s
and more redistribution across income levels, as compared with the other types of families,
in particular communitarian and egalitarian nuclear. The link between the type of families
and the design of pension systems is robust to the introduction of other historical pre-
existing conditions, such as legal origin, religion, urbanization, democratization.
Besides having a strong historical component, our analysis may shed some light on the
feasibility of today’s pension reforms, by explaining how individuals’ behavior as shaped
by cultural/institutional elements inﬂuences the peacemakers decision on which institution
(e.g., pension system) to choose, how to design it (namely, earnings-related versus ﬂat-rate)
and how to implement the policy. This is a promising direction for future research.
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.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose ﬁrst that there are no pensions. In the old regime with strong family ties, if
the adults do not save, they divide their resources (income and previous savings, if any)
between their own consumption and consumption of the old:
 + −1(1 + )=
 + 

Since adults have to provide the elderly with at least 
 =  ( s e eE q . 4 )w ec a nw r i t et h e
consumption of the adults as follows:
(1 − )+−1(1 + )=

If instead the adults decide to save, we have:
(1 − )+−1(1 + ) −  = 

Since individuals have no property rights on t h e i rs a v i n g s ,w h e no l d ,t h e yw i l lr e c e i v e
at r a n s f e r from the next adults’ generation, so that their old age consumption is always

+1 = . It is straightforward to see that their utility decreases with savings, and thus
the adults choose not to save.
Suppose now that the adults have to decide upon the introduction of the pension
system. The utility becomes
 ( =0    0) = (1 − )+−1(1 + )
since  = (1 − ), which is clearly decreasing in  (for 0) so that the adults will
decide not to introduce pensions ( =0 ).
.2 Proof of proposition 2
In weak family ties the old have property rights and 
 ≥ . We consider separately the
cases in which initial savings are zero, i.e. −1 =0or positive −1  0.
Suppose ﬁrst that −1 =0 . In absence of pensions, if the adults decide not to save,
they divide income between their own consumption and the subsistence consumption of
the old, 
 = . Hence, 
 = (1 − ). Since, with no savings, old age consumption is

+1 = , the utility function for an adult who decides not to save is equal to:
( =0   =0 )=
 + 
+1 =  (5)
25If instead the adults save, they keep their consumption in adult age at the minimum level,

 = , provide the elderly with the minimum amount of transfer, 
 = ,a n ds a v e
their remaining income  = (1 −  − ). Their old age consumption depends on their
savings in the good state, and on the family transfer when have no enough resources:

+1 =( 1+) +( 1− ) with a corresponding utility of:
 (  0  =0 )=
 + 
+1 =  +( 1+)(1 −  − )+( 1− ) (6)
A simple comparison of the utilities at Eq. 5 and Eq. 6 shows that the utility with no
savings is larger for 

1−−, and viceversa.
If pensions were introduced, the utility function of a non-saver adult becomes:
 ( =0    0) = (1 − )+ = (1 − ) (7)
which is decreasing in , and lower than the utility with no pension,  ( =0   =0 )=.
Hence, non-saver adults do not support pensions.
Consider now the case of positive past savings, i.e. −1  0. The adults have to
provide the old with the minimum level of consumption  only in the case of a low rate
of return (with probability 1 − ). If they decide not to save, their consumption in adult
age is equal to 
 = [1 − (1 − )], while in old age they still get 
+1 = .T h u s ,t h e
utility of a young individual who decides not to save is equal to
 ( =0   =0 )=
 + 
+1 = (1 + ) (8)
If instead the adults decide to save, they keep their consumption in adult age at the
minimum level, 
 = ; they provide the elderly with the minimum amount of transfer,

 = , but only in case of low rate of return; and they save their remaining income
 = [1 − (1 − ) − ]. Their old age consumption will depend on their savings in the
good state, and on the family transfer in the bad state 
+1 =( 1+) +( 1− ),a n d
the utility will be:
 (  0  =0 )=
 + 
+1 =  +( 1+)[1 − (1 − ) − ]+( 1− ) (9)
C o m p a r i n ge q . 5a n de q . 6 ,i ti se a s yt os e et h a ti f

1−(1−)− the adults decide




1−− the threshold found in case of zero past
s a v i n g sa p p l i e s ,a n dw eh a v et h a ts a v i n g sa r ep o s i t i v ei f

1−−.
To show that pensions will not be introduced by savers, notice that in this case savings
would be equal to  = (1−−). Using simple algebra, the utility of an adult becomes:
 (  0   0) =  + (1 −

1 − 
− )(1 + )+( 1− )
26It is easy to see that the above utility is lower than the one obtained at Eq. 9 in
absence of pensions; and thus adults choose zero pensions.
.3 Proof of proposition 3
To examine the choices of a strong family under the "new regime", consider ﬁr s tt h a tp a s t
savings are equal to zero, −1 =0 , and there are no pensions. If an adult decides not to
save, his utility is:
 ( =0   =0 )=
 + 
+1 = [1 − (1 + )] +  = (1 − )
If the adult decides to save, his adult consumption is kept at subsistence level 
 = 
and savings are  = [1 −  − (1 + )]. Since, in this new regime, adults have property
rights on their savings, but still receive a family transfer when old in the bad state, the
utility of an adult who decides to save is
 (  0  =0 )= + [1 −  − (1 + )](1 + )+( 1− )
Comparing the two levels of utility in case of zero and positive savings, it is easy to see
that zero savings is a preferred choice if 

1−−(1+) and viceversa.
With pensions, the utility of a non-saver adult becomes:
 ( =0    0) = (1 − )+ = (1 − ) (10)
Since 
  0, the adults will at most decide to keep  at its minimum level needed
to ensure the subsistence consumption to the elderly,  =( 1− ) = , and thus
 = (1 − ) and





1−, this utility is larger than the utility reached in case of zero pension.
Suppose now that past savings were positive, −1  0, and thus the adults have to
provide a transfer  to the elderly only in the bad state. If the adult decides not to save,
his utility given by adult and old age consumption is
 ( =0   =0 )=
 + 
+1 = [1 − (1 − )+]
If instead he decides to save, we have

 = 
 = [1 −  − (1 + )(1 − )]
27
+1 =( 1+) +( 1− )
 (  0  =0 )= + [1 −  − (1 + )(1 − )](1 + )+( 1− )
Thus, the adult decides to save if 









With savings and positive pensions, we would have the following adult consumption,

 = ,s a v i n g s , = [1 −  − ], and old age consumption 
+1 =( 1+) + .
Again, since 
  0, pensions would be kept at their minimum level needed to guarantee
the subsistence consumption to the old in the bad state, that is,  = (1−)=,w i t h
 = (1 − ). Thus, the utility with pensions and savings would be:
 (  0   0) =  + [1 −  − ](1+)+(1 − )




.4 Proof of proposition 4
It follows from the same steps as proposition 3 but with 
+1 =  instead of 
+1 = 
A Data appendix
We here describe the variables used in the empirical analysis and their sources.
• Replacement rates of the pension system at 50%, 75%, 100% and 150% of average
labor income are built on Whitehouse (2007) “Pension Panorama” The World Bank
and OECD (2009) “Pension at a Glance. Special Edition: Asia/Paciﬁc. From these
data we calculate repl50_1: the ratio between the replacement rate of a worker
earning one-half of the average income and the one of a worker earning exactly the
average income; repl75_150: the ratio between the replacement rate of a worker
earning the 75% of the average income and the one of a worker earning 150% of the
average income and replacem1: the replacement rate of a worker earning the average
income. Data on repl75_150 are available for the following countries: Algeria, Ar-
gentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary , Iran, Ireland, Italy,
28Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yemen.
Data on replacemen1 and repl50_1 include also China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan,
Vietnam.
• Coverage1564 is the share of population between 15 and 64 years old that is covered
by the pension system. It is constructed as the mean of diﬀerent observations over
time. Source: World Bank (2007). HDNSP pension database. With respect to the
previous variable, the sample includes some additional countries, Afghanistan, Al-
bania, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Syria, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, but excludes
Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, New Zealand.
• Pengdp_91_2006: this variable indicates how much pensions count as a share of
GDP. The data were collected in diﬀerent time periods, in particular between 1991
and 2006. However most of them come from a period around the 2000. Source:
World Bank (2007), HDNSP pension database. The sample includes the same coun-
tries as coverage 1564 with the addition of Azerbaijan, Belize, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Kuwait, New Zealand, Panama,
Russia, Slovenia, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the exclusion
of Bahrain, Dominica, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, South Korea.
• Family types variables:
- AbsoluteEgal: this variable is equal to one if the family is absolute nuclear and
zero otherwise. Source: Todd (1983).
- Community: this variable is equal to one if the family is communitarian and zero
otherwise. Source: Todd (1983).
- Authoritarian: this variable is equal to zero if there are authoritarian families and
zero otherwise. Source: Todd (1983).
- Egal Nuclear: this variable is equal to zero if there are egalitarian nuclear families
and zero otherwise. Source: Todd (1983).
• Legal origins variables: the origin of the legal system in a country is indicated by
a set of dummy variables l_eng l_soc l_ger l_fra. Each dummy is equal to one if
the country has the particular legal origin of interest and zero otherwise. In general
29we do not have overlapping among the dummies. More precisely: l_eng refers to an
Anglo-Saxon legal origin; l_soc refers to a socialist legal origin; l_ger to a Germany
legal origin; l_fra to a French legal origin. Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
• Religion variables:
- Cath1900, Orth1900, Prot1900, Mus1900 contain the percentage in 1900 over the
entire population of Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant and Muslin people respectively.
Source: CIA factbook.
- Herfrel1900: this variable is a proxy for the level of religious heterogeneity is
a country in 1900. It has been constructed computing the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl
index using the religion data. In particular we have data on the following religions:
catholic, protestant, orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhism, East Religions;
• Urban: this variable contains the share of population living in an urban area in the
early XX century. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI).
• Polity2_1900: This data presents an evaluation of the political situation in the diﬀer-
ent countries. The ranking goes from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated
democracy). The score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DE-
MOC score, where these indicators are derived from coding of the competitiveness
of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment
and constraints on the chief executive using diﬀerent weights. Source: Center of Sys-
temic peace, the Policy IV Project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).
Data refers to the year 1900.
• Lngdppc2000: logarithm of the GDP per capita in the 2000. Source: World Bank,
World Development Indicators
• Pop_65_2000: share of people older than 65 years old over the entire population in
2000. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
• Geographic dummy variables:
- Oecd: dummy variable equal to one if the country of interest is an OECD country
and zero otherwise;
- Laam: dummy variable that is equal to one if the country of interest is a Latin
America country and zero otherwise;
- Africa: dummy variable that is equal to one if the country of interest is an African
country and zero otherwise;
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  (1) (2) (3)  
VARIABLES  fam_imp pare_respect pare_respon   
   
age  -  0.00689*** -0.000724 -  0.00412***  
  (0.000976) (0.000891) (0.00106)   
agesq  7.74e-05*** -2.91e-06 2.74e -  05*** 
  (1.24e-05) (1.06e-05) (1.00e  -05)  
income   -  0.00885*** 0.00602*** 0.000759    
  (0.00220) (0.00199) (0.00266)   
educ   0.00388 0.00875*** 0.0150***    
  (0.00234) (0.00250) (0.00318)   
polviews  0.00303 0.0146*** 0.00801**    
  (0.00427) (0.00269) (0.00350)   
community  0.0392 -0.135** 0.0857***     
  (0.0397) (0.0647) (0.0313)   
aut    0.0187 0.0120 0.163***   
  (0.0328) (0.0883) (0.0486)   
egalnucl    0.0177 -0.142** 0.0136   
  (0.0354) (0.0647) (0.0253)   
Constant    1.259*** 0.219*** 0.180***    
  (0.0411) (0.0642) (0.0393)   
   
Observations  101169 94631 89011   
R-  squared 0.007 0.037 0.028  
 Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
community 85  0.4470588 0.50014 0 1 
aut 85  0.1294118 0.3376472 0 1 
egalnucl 85  0.3411765 0.4769182 0 1 
absonucl 85  0.0823529 0.2765332 0 1 
africa 85  0.0705882 0.2576559 0 1 
asia 85  0.0588235 0.2366905 0 1 
laam 85  0.2705882 0.4469003 0 1 
oecd 85  0.2823529 0.4528157 0 1 
l_eng 85  0.1764706 0.3834825 0 1 
l_soc 85  0.2470588 0.4338609 0 1 
l_fra 85  0.4823529 0.502654 0 1 
l_ger 85  0.0470588 0.2130215 0 1 
cath1900 49  0.4662041 0.4243819 0 1 
prot1900 49  0.2058776 0.3351906 0 0.992 
orth1900 49  0.0683224 0.1434626 0 0.839 
mus1900 49  0.189102 0.3724387 0 0.997 
herfrel1900 49  0.7779092 0.1950197 0.338706 1 
urban 79  63383.54 19569.98 15400 97000 
polity2_1900 46  -0.2391304 6.147031 -10 10 
pop_65_2000 83  8.96701 5.089319 1.373369 18.23579 
lngdppc 82  8.115943 1.393526 4.706893 10.47798 
maj 55  0.2363636 0.4287638 0 1 




 Table 3: Baseline specification 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES repl50_1  repl75_150  replacem1  coverage1564  pengdp_91_2006 
          
community -0.470***  -0.512***  29.54***  -31.96***  0.743 
 (0.150)  (0.120)  (10.45)  (8.560)  (2.267) 
aut -0.218  -0.237*  12.81  -1.228  1.819 
 (0.149)  (0.139)  (8.514)  (3.452)  (1.444) 
egalnucl -0.359**  -0.461***  28.50***  -8.203*** 2.379 
 (0.162)  (0.116)  (7.285)  (2.602)  (1.848) 
oecd -0.0516  -0.0509  10.17  13.18*  4.176** 
 (0.0896)  (0.0561)  (9.138)  (7.785)  (2.045) 
laam  0.205 0.173 -8.536 -27.69***  -3.114 
 (0.172)  (0.116) (12.97) (7.115) (3.145)
africa -0.104**  -0.00697  14.89  -1.353  -2.718** 
 (0.0445)  (0.0354)  (10.05)  (5.787)  (1.087) 
Constant 1.564***  1.529***  44.94***  58.53*** 4.453* 
 (0.153)  (0.122)  (10.53)  (7.820)  (2.311) 
Observations 55  50 55  68  78 
R-squared 0.314  0.378  0.185  0.661  0.360 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4: Legal origin 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES repl50_1  repl75_150  replacem1  coverage1564  pengdp_91_2006 
          
community -0.348*  -0.387**  17.43*  -36.96***  -3.094 
 (0.180)  (0.166)  (10.12)  (7.908)  (2.136) 
aut -0.0100  -0.0291  3.132  -7.160  -1.034 
 (0.156)  (0.156)  (9.235)  (8.077)  (1.526) 
egalnucl -0.143  -0.282*  9.865  -10.13* 0.332 
 (0.192)  (0.161)  (11.44)  (5.277)  (1.758) 
l_eng 0.0831  0.197  -10.69  -16.87**  -5.185*** 
 (0.161)  (0.165)  (8.109)  (7.913)  (1.384) 
l_soc -0.190  0.0239  -0.893  7.020  1.667 
 (0.146)  (0.144)  (9.834)  (10.45)  (1.913) 
l_ger -0.329*  -0.213  4.562  -8.339  0.610 
 (0.175)  (0.162)  (10.84)  (6.569)  (1.801) 
l_fra -0.193  -0.0607  14.87  -14.46  -2.507** 
 (0.127)  (0.121)  (10.38)  (8.994)  (1.246) 
oecd -0.102  -0.0481  4.883  18.29**  4.378* 
 (0.120)  (0.103)  (12.41)  (7.116)  (2.290) 
laam 0.169  0.189  -14.98  -19.88**  -2.289 
 (0.187)  (0.138)  (15.47)  (7.878)  (2.846) 
africa -0.0512  0.0635  1.342  9.558*  -0.533 
 (0.0646)  (0.0702)  (17.74)  (5.222)  (1.430) 
Constant 1.582***  1.395***  55.74***  67.09***  8.313** 
 (0.239)  (0.217)  (16.10)  (10.54)  (3.169) 
          
Observations 55  50 55  68  78 
R-squared 0.410  0.465  0.274  0.759  0.529 
 Table 5: Religion (1) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES repl50_1  repl75_150  replacem1  coverage1564  pengdp_91_2006 
          
community -0.441***  -0.518***  21.36**  -7.959*  1.493 
 (0.154)  (0.140)  (9.763)  (4.632)  (1.688) 
aut -0.230  -0.272*  13.34  1.290  2.484 
 (0.167)  (0.158)  (8.382)  (3.109)  (1.543) 
egalnucl -0.301  -0.515***  25.55**  -4.183  6.068*** 
 (0.184)  (0.158)  (10.06)  (4.161)  (1.816) 
oecd -0.0218  -0.0340  5.801  5.675  0.437 
 (0.103)  (0.0709)  (8.630)  (4.024)  (1.522) 
laam  0.185 0.182 -9.600 -30.53***  -8.789*** 
 (0.187)  (0.124) (13.43) (5.612) (1.860)
africa -0.0804**  0.00311  -6.112  6.929 0.527 
 (0.0349)  (0.0369)  (12.83)  (4.947)  (0.999) 
cath1900 -0.0822  -0.00204  4.545  -0.0206  -3.221 
 (0.178)  (0.141)  (19.39)  (9.672)  (5.294) 
prot1900 -0.0303  -0.0872  3.023  7.061  -0.560 
 (0.168)  (0.134)  (14.39)  (7.986)  (4.874) 
orth1900 -0.347  -0.0142  13.50  5.183  -4.111 
 (0.248)  (0.200)  (23.51)  (11.43)  (5.753) 
mus1900 -0.0858  -0.0544  31.85  -38.94***  -9.189* 
 (0.171)  (0.129)  (20.44)  (10.11)  (5.187) 
Constant 1.603***  1.575***  45.09***  60.75*** 9.572* 
 (0.201)  (0.162)  (16.55)  (8.267)  (5.190) 
Observations 49  49 49  47  47 




Table 6: Religion (2)  Herfindal index of religious homogeneity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES repl50_1  repl75_150  replacem1  coverage1564  pengdp_91_2006 
          
community -0.580***  -0.538***  34.76***  -20.71*  -0.715 
 (0.141)  (0.122)  (10.75)  (11.71)  (2.385) 
aut -0.310**  -0.264*  13.42  2.792  3.120 
 (0.146)  (0.145)  (9.662)  (6.131)  (2.070) 
egalnucl -0.472***  -0.494***  29.09***  -3.586  5.555*** 
 (0.148)  (0.112)  (9.577)  (6.288)  (1.983) 
oecd -0.0835  -0.0648  7.344  9.304  1.044 
 (0.0915)  (0.0654)  (9.667)  (9.180)  (1.875) 
laam  0.198 0.168 -10.74 -28.73***  -8.126*** 
 (0.166)  (0.115)  (13.26)  (8.080)  (2.102) 
africa -0.107**  -0.0183  7.653  -12.48*  -2.683** 
 (0.0419)  (0.0441)  (11.00)  (7.367)  (1.322) 
herfrel1900 0.370*  0.108  -3.673  -17.92  -4.881 
 (0.188)  (0.152)  (20.11)  (14.03)  (3.655) 
Constant 1.378***  1.480***  49.93***  72.88***  10.46*** 
 (0.174)  (0.145)  (14.02)  (10.21)  (2.958) 
          
Observations 49  49 49  47  47 
R-squared 0.381  0.378  0.252  0.684  0.534 Table 7: Urban 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES repl50_1  repl75_150  replacem1  coverage1564  pengdp_91_2006 
         
community -0.546***  -0.535***  35.11***  -19.13*  1.135 
  (0.156) (0.129) (10.79)  (10.26)  (1.799) 
aut -0.233  -0.243*  13.95  0.871  1.949 
  (0.148) (0.137) (8.367)  (4.002)  (1.350) 
egalnucl -0.413**  -0.483***  32.40***  -0.495  5.495*** 
  (0.167) (0.125) (8.414)  (4.155)  (1.514) 
oecd -0.0288  -0.0474  8.495  8.510  1.602 
 (0.0942)  (0.0574)  (9.107)  (7.970)  (1.639) 
laam 0.235  0.181  -10.72  -32.89***  -7.427*** 
 (0.175)  (0.123) (12.95) (7.230)  (1.766)
africa -0.0827*  -0.0112  13.30  -7.366  -3.295*** 
 (0.0433)  (0.0337)  (10.62)  (5.661)  (1.136) 
urban -3.24e-06  -1.30e-06  0.000238  0.000491***  9.14e-05*** 
 (2.39e-06)  (2.54e-06)  (0.000236)  (0.000140)  (2.74e-05) 
Constant 1.813***  1.634***  26.66  22.22*  -0.626 
  (0.240) (0.239) (21.14)  (13.23)  (2.448) 
         
Observations  55 50 55  64  73 
R-squared  0.338 0.382 0.208  0.753  0.541 
 
 
Table 8: Democracy 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES repl50_1  repl75_150  replacem1  coverage1564  pengdp_91_2006 
          
community -0.663**  -0.543**  44.77**  -37.60***  -3.729 
 (0.306)  (0.248)  (21.40)  (8.632)  (2.636) 
aut -0.337*  -0.349**  17.42  0.712  2.239* 
 (0.186)  (0.150)  (11.17)  (4.693)  (1.193) 
egalnucl -0.330  -0.453***  28.93***  -9.371**  2.441* 
 (0.200)  (0.139)  (9.305)  (3.658)  (1.370) 
oecd -0.217*  -0.114  6.885  9.592  0.297 
 (0.119)  (0.106)  (15.08)  (5.673)  (2.228) 
laam 0.00230  0.115  -11.75  -28.30***  -8.212*** 
 (0.198)  (0.132)  (18.20)  (7.620)  (2.429) 
africa -0.134  -0.0609  -18.07*  -7.621  -7.392** 
 (0.0894)  (0.0560)  (10.46)  (5.094)  (3.025) 
polity2_1900 -0.00357  0.00299  0.114  0.444  -0.0918 
 (0.0127)  (0.00972)  (0.955)  (0.366)  (0.0900) 
Constant 1.755***  1.587***  48.09**  60.68***  9.344*** 
 (0.237)  (0.194)  (18.91)  (6.762)  (2.574) 
          
Observations 34  33 34  39  45 






 Table 9: GDP and Share of elderly 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES repl50_1  repl75_150  replacem1  coverage1564  pengdp_91_2006 
          
community -0.583***  -0.591***  38.07***  -14.76***  0.915 
 (0.179)  (0.146)  (11.53)  (4.596)  (1.435) 
aut -0.203  -0.232*  12.51  -4.331  0.467 
 (0.148)  (0.136)  (8.791)  (3.898)  (1.138) 
egalnucl -0.365**  -0.487***  31.28***  -13.02*** 2.243 
 (0.173)  (0.127)  (8.843)  (4.157)  (1.359) 
oecd 0.0453  0.0142  3.427  -2.484  0.00698 
 (0.118)  (0.0812)  (10.89)  (3.541)  (1.410) 
laam 0.118  0.122  -6.369  -5.984  -1.292 
 (0.190)  (0.121) (15.89) (5.345) (1.813)
africa -0.142**  -0.0459  15.26  1.682  0.422 
 (0.0552)  (0.0646)  (13.47)  (3.230)  (0.707) 
pop_65_2000 -0.00870  -0.00274  0.0504 2.655***  0.670*** 
 (0.00703)  (0.00570)  (0.978)  (0.424)  (0.106) 
lngdppc -0.0652  -0.0636  5.812*  5.650***  0.418 
 (0.0494)  (0.0571)  (3.419)  (1.837)  (0.323) 
Constant 2.230***  2.132***  -6.655  -18.35  -4.454* 
 (0.481)  (0.545)  (33.20)  (15.49)  (2.509) 
Observations 54  49 54  65  75 
R-squared 0.350  0.393  0.204  0.885  0.742 
 
Table 10: Electoral rules and forms of government 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES repl50_1  repl75_150  replacem1  coverage1564  pengdp_91_2006 
          
community -0.399*  -0.495**  18.85  -36.62***  -3.310* 
 (0.197)  (0.192)  (11.57)  (10.75)  (1.669) 
aut -0.0943  -0.182  0.359  -12.96*  -1.372 
 (0.220)  (0.201)  (10.05)  (7.552)  (1.426) 
egalnucl -0.287  -0.438**  19.11**  -18.71**  1.906 
 (0.194)  (0.162)  (7.290)  (7.114)  (1.545) 
maj 0.188  0.0906  -17.50***  -15.60**  -3.830*** 
 (0.198)  (0.175)  (6.152)  (7.456)  (1.006) 
pres -0.176  -0.149  1.665  -8.651  -1.001 
 (0.167)  (0.152)  (9.593)  (6.410)  (0.667) 
oecd -0.0865  -0.0836  9.918  5.619  1.052 
 (0.113)  (0.0712)  (10.62)  (7.794)  (1.424) 
laam  0.366 0.303 -11.36 -26.83***  -7.564*** 
 (0.252)  (0.195)  (14.30)  (7.382)  (1.632) 
Constant 1.489***  1.519***  57.46***  77.94***  10.46*** 
 (0.223)  (0.195)  (13.24)  (10.69)  (1.790) 
          
Observations 41  39  41  46  52 
R-squared 0.257  0.339  0.255  0.736  0.584 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






























Ss (Ps) are savings (Pensions) in strong family types
Sw (Pw) are savings (Pensions) in weak family types
Figure 1. The New Regime: Summary of the results
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figure 2: The four groups
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figure 3: The redistributive design of pensions: repl50_1
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figure 4: The redistributive design of pensions: repl75_150
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figure 5: Legal origins
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